"Rising" States and Global Reach: Measuring "Globality" among BRICS/MIKTA Countries

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Global reach is equated with national ambition. In the contemporary international system, one measure of global reach for states is their inclusion in global summits. This association is particularly compelling for putative "rising" states from the Global South, among the BRICS (China, India, and Brazil) and also a less well-known forum, MIKTA (Mexico, South Korea, Turkey, and Indonesia) groupings. Yet the standard means of examining the attributes of rising states via country specific and impressionistic studies appears to reveal that these rising powers are similar in many respects but there are significant differences as well. To help identify these differences we turn to a concept and data referred to as "globality." We believe that this concept is helpful in more accurately analyzing the global reach of rising Global South countries. Though not that well known in the international relations literature, globality emphasizes agency by self-aware actors. Globality can be operationalized by tracing certain dimensions: institutional/diplomatic range; trade profile; and the trajectory of official development assistance. Broadly, the conclusion drawn from such a globality analysis substantiates a sharp distinction between the BRICS members and the MIKTA countries. The BRICS countries have some considerable capacity for global reach while it turns out that the MIKTA countries are regionally entrapped and thus less capable of global projection. Moreover, the specifics in terms of this pattern of differentiation are salient as well. The overall confirmation of an interconnection between subjective impressions of hierarchy and objective measurements of global projection, underscore the contrast between BRICS and MIKTA in summitry dynamics.

Introduction

Global projection, notably membership in global summits, is commonly equated in the literature and in the politics of international relations with an enhanced country status. Promoting a global reach (Volgy et al. 2011) by a state, is associated with national ambition as opposed to being a receptor of social and economic forces. In some cases, to be sure, the image of a state recalibrating its global reach is on closer examination more accurately an expression of compensation for a shrinking role in the world. The obvious example is the United Kingdom. The push by many Brexeters toward a "Global Britain" provides, in fact, an instance, perhaps, of national decline (Van Reenen 2017). But whatever the instrumental capabilities in advancing this type of strategy, the objective of going global corresponds with an aspirational agenda.

Global reach can often be contrasted with an image of being trapped, possibly uncomfortably in a particular region. In the current British case this juxtaposition is made explicit, with a revised global strategy being advocated in tandem with the rejection of the European Union (EU). But even if

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not manifested through a similar sort of geographic-oriented break, what stands out across the entire list of putative rising countries from the Global South, is a desire to move beyond their own neighborhoods. It is only those states that project global agency that are deemed to rank in the top-tier of nation states (Nolte 2017).

The Concept of Globality

Highlighting the pattern of activity demonstrates the value of alternative lens and measurement of standards through which to analyze global projection. What we are looking for then is a more appropriate means of understanding what is meant by global reach and/or projection. Here, “globality,” can be seen to be a condition rather than just a set of processes (Robertson 2007, 524).

In keeping with the theme of moving, ambitiously beyond a particular neighborhood, the differentiation of globality with a regional orientation is made explicit. As Schäfer puts it: “globality refers to the whole geobody, but a region is only part of it, therefore less than the whole. Hence, a region cannot be global” (Schäfer 2007). In terms of positioning there is thus a trajectory beyond “a narrow slice of geography” (Sirkin et al. 2009). The condition of globality is equated with “a reality beyond globalization – the world of globality . . . in which traditional and familiar boundaries are being surmounted or made irrelevant” (Yergin 1998).

To be sure, globality does not represent a singular condition exclusive to just states. In fact, there is a rich body of globality literature in the business management field that captures the evolution of multinational corporations. What is salient about globality is that space is allowed for “the empowerment of self-aware social actors,” the key component in the projection of global reach (Robertson 1992, 132). “[I]n its simplest meaning, globality is the “condition or state in which things are global” with the “outcome” determined through “conscious and intentional actions” (Shaw 2000, 17f.).

Of relevance in the crossover of the concept from the world of corporations to the world of states, is an appreciation that globality is no longer restricted to traditional establishment members, but to a wider set of actors including challengers from the Global South. Above all globality puts an emphasis on agency. No less than in the application of the concept of globality to global firms, the image is of a state reaching out to the world in an environment of hyper-competition in which actors are “competing with everyone from everywhere for everything” (Sirkin et al. 2009; Business Wire 2008).

In either case, some of the “new challengers aren’t simply serving and supplying incumbent leaders and dominating home markets; [they] are grabbing worldwide leadership positions” (Business Wire 2008). A definition of themselves as strategic actors, a characterization essential for a global projection, indicates for rising states—as much as equivalent corporations—that they have moved beyond the identity of being connected primarily with their own region. A significant indicator of this amplified degree of recognition is via representation in the G20 Leaders’ Summit (Alexandroff and Cooper 2010). The ambition for these states is to move from being pivotal actors at the regional level, to being recognized with the elevated status of global institutionalization.
The open question, however, remains an operational one. If a global reach is deemed to be far more attractive than just a regional projection, which of the members of these two rising state groups can be said to possess globality? Such an examination is made more salient by the wide number of states that are cast as having the aspirations and potential to “rise” beyond the regional level, and in so doing not only project globally on an individual country-specific basis but in collective terms as part of distinctive clusters of countries rising in tandem with each other. This re-ordering shifts the level of analysis away from the hub G20 to forms of institutionalized association highlighting group activity of “rising” countries parallel to the G20, and for that matter older forms of activity of incumbent states via the G7.

With the emergence of these global forum, the most evident parallel form of association to the G20 is the BRICS Summit. This largely “rising powers” summit consists of China, India, Brazil and Russia, with South Africa then added in 2011 (Wilson and Purushothman 2003). However, it must be acknowledged as well that the BRICS is not the only forum of countries deemed to be “rising.” As pointed out above, MIKTA is a second cluster of rising states with a membership that currently includes Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea (Korea), and Turkey (as well as Australia). It merits particular attention as a rising power setting (MIKTA Vision Statement 2015; Republic of Indonesia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018) though unlike the BRICS, MIKTA has not moved to a leaders’ level summit. It has in fact remained a periodic gathering of foreign ministers.

The key modalities of MIKTA have been drawn out in some other writings, most notably in a previous contribution to this journal, Global Summitry (Cooper 2015). Nevertheless, a contextual comparison between the core members of BRICS and MIKTA on the basis of globality is potentially innovative. The general hypothesis for these two groupings is as follows: the BRICS—made up of far more ambitious and capable nations—tilt far more sharply toward the condition of globality, with the MIKTA countries regionally entrapped, perhaps, are less capable of global projection and reach. So, the central question in this article is whether such a sharp distinction and separation among these two country groups is confirmed not by subjective measures but also by a set of objective measures including: institutional/diplomatic range; trade profile; and the trajectory of official development assistance.

Probing Impressions of Global Projection versus Regional Entrapment

The interconnection between hierarchical position and global reach is reinforced by the growth in a literature that equates the two. What globality captures is the dynamic of change, with neither the status or the projection of a country located as fixed but in a constant state of rearrangement (Scholte 2005). This means in effect a considerable emphasis on the shifting positions of challengers, especially those from big countries outside of the traditional establishment. Publications on this theme highlight in particular the global footprint of China, with books encompassing both the celebratory as much as the critical: China Goes Global, Global Giant, and The Specter of Global China (Paus et al. 2009; Shambaugh 2013; Lee 2014). Other putative rising states have gained some attention in a similar fashion as well, with
the underlying reference to how they measure up to global China. A book, for example, produced by a Council on Foreign Relations Fellow in the United States is subtitled: How India is making its place in the world (Ayres 2018). And there is a Global India Foundation in Kolkata (Global India Foundation 2018). Yet despite this wave of positive notice, questions about global India still abound (Stokes 2016). The possibility of global Brazil is even more problematic, with books such as Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power, or Aspirational Power: Brazil on the long road to Global Influence (Reid 2014; Mares and Trinkunas 2016) highlighting the various obstacles on the path to global status.

Russia for its part falls into a rather different category. The literature tends to depict it not as a state with an authentic image as a “rising state” from the Global South but rather a state coming back from a substantive decline with the collapse of the Soviet Union (MacFarlane 2006). What jumps out from recent analyzes, is the depiction of Russia moving to reclaim a global reach. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, for example, examines recent Russian foreign policy through the prism of The Return of Global Russia: An Analytical Framework (Stronski and Sokolsky 2016).

As noted above, what best binds this high-profile cluster of putative rising powers together is their common membership in the global forum, the BRICS. To a great extent, the impression from these states rising individually goes together with a collective image of these countries—or at least the core of its membership, namely China, India and Brazil—being in the vanguard of the “rise of the rest” (Zakaria 2008). As a result, the rise of the BRICS as a group goes hand in hand with state-specific projections of an enhanced global footprint (Stuenkel 2015; Cooper 2016).

Whereas the core BRICS states all have some support within the country-specific and largely impressionistic literature about the impact of their global footprint, the treatment of the MIKTA group is far more limited with an emphasis on regional entrapment (Cooper 2015). There are references to global South Korea (Korea) and global Turkey. Nonetheless, in both cases far great shortcomings are introduced, not just because political or social agency is deficient (as suggested most strongly in the case of Brazil, with images of obstacles getting in the way of global aspirations) but because of structural constraints that tie them into a position as regional not global actors.

The image of global Turkey is conditioned by this type of contextual factor, so that impressionistic references are made for instance to global Turkey in Europe not a comprehensive global Turkey (Aydin-Duzgit et al. 2013). Similar barriers impose restrictions on Korea’s global footprint. A 2010 McKinsey report lauded Korea for its ambition but also noted that: “the country remains largely unknown to outsiders. [and that] Geographically, South Korea finds itself squeezed among three titans: China, Japan, and Russia” (Barton 2010). Moreover, the obstacles to the establishment of a global footprint for the other core MIKTA countries are deemed to be even far more serious. The image of global Indonesia is nonexistent except as a legacy of colonialism (Taylor 2012). In Mexico’s case, as Stewart Patrick, another fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations noted: “assuming a new global role will require psychological as well as policy adjustments. Mexico must update its longstanding attachment to nonintervention and sovereignty to an era of interdependence. It must become less coy about defining and asserting its national interests. And it must educate its inward-looking
population about their stakes in an open, rules-bound international order” (Patrick 2016).

The overall representation is one of a “subjective duality” when examining the extension of a global footprint. On the one hand, there is a category of putative rising states (clustered in the core BRICS membership) that are to one degree or another establishing themselves as global actors. In this cluster China grabs by far the most attention, with Shambaugh’s book being a one country-specific study that goes beyond the impressionistic (Shambaugh 2013). On the other hand, there are those countries (including the core cluster of MIKTA states) that can be judged to be ambitious actors but ones that do not have the same degree of global footprint. Unlike the BRICS, the MIKTA cluster is designated as a set of countries unable to escape from their own regions.

One major concern of this article is to explore whether these state-specific—and impressionistic oriented—images are reflected in the objective data relating to a global projection on a comparative basis. A crucial part of this examination is an extended comparison between the BRICS and MIKTA countries with some specific nuances of globality. To gauge more closely the similarities and differences among Global South rising states, the analysis is restricted to China, India and Brazil with the BRICS, and Korea, Turkey, Mexico, and Indonesia in the MIKTA. By leaving out the membership of Russia and South Africa in the BRICS and Australia in the MIKTA, a number of problems are avoided. Not only is Russia regarded as a special case due to its prior status as a superpower but South Africa is judged an outlier by most geopolitical or economic criteria. Indeed, South Africa was excluded from the original analysis of Goldman Sachs. The early examinations targeted the BRICs, not BRICS. Moreover, the image of a global South Africa finds little resonance. On the MIKTA cluster, Australia is left out due to its anomalous condition apart from the Global South (US National Intelligence Council).¹

Measuring the First Dimension of Globality: Institutional/Diplomatic Range

The first key metric of globality relates to a generalized assessment of institutional/diplomatic range. At first glance, this institutional/diplomatic measurement plays on the theme in the country-specific impressionistic oriented literature in respect to the contrast between China and the other rising states. China is of course the only country besides Russia to hold a permanent seat (P5 with veto power), on the Security Council of the United Nations (UNSC). Nonetheless, its global reach goes well beyond this formalized status. China is not only active in a wide number of UN specialized agencies, but the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). And China’s footprint is amplified by its membership in the G20, and links to Group of 77 (with official statements issued in the name of the G77 and

reinforcing the image in terms of Global South representation), the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Non-Aligned Movement or NAM (as an observer).

Consistent with this pattern of institutional membership, the main feature of China’s organizational profile is representation not only in, but beyond, its immediate neighborhood. Unlike some of its counterparts, China is not trapped inside its own region. China belongs to a number of organizations with membership made up exclusively of Asian countries, notably the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN (dialogue partner) through ASEAN plus 3, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum or ARF, the East Asian summit (EAS), and the Mekong River group. But China is also in a wide number of interregional organizations made up the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), as well as the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), straddling Asian and non-Asian membership. And well beyond its immediate region, China has representational links to the Caribbean Development Bank, the African Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, in addition to the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Nor has China’s institutional reach beyond its region stalled. The momentum is particularly striking with respect to the interregional side, with Chinese leadership prominent in the establishment both of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China also holds the headquarters of the New Development Bank (NDB) in Shanghai.

India’s claim to a high ranking in terms of the condition of globality is based on a membership in the traditional formal organizations, mainly the UN specialized agencies, the IMF, the BIS, the IBRD, and the WTO, as well as the G20. Unlike China, it is a full member of the G77 and the NAM. And India has continued to be a member of the Commonwealth, notwithstanding its status as a republic. Along with China, India is also a member of the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, but not the Caribbean Development Bank. Still in comparison to China it is the deficiencies in India’s global institutional reach that jump out. In terms of informal groupings, the G4 (the group of countries made of Brazil, Germany and Japan as well as India supporting each other’s bids for permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council) has not been successful, and has faded in relevance. On top of this limitation, India has a much less robust profile in terms of interregional groups, straddling Asian and non-Asian participation. India is a member of the EAS, and ACD, as well as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). But it is not yet a member of APEC, or the ASEAN plus 3, and it is only recently moved (along with Pakistan) from observer status in the SCO. India does belong to IBSA (with Brazil, and South Africa) but this organization has stalled in comparison to the BRICS.

If there is a distinctive feature about India’s institutional range, it is the heavier concentration on sub-regional organizations where it holds a degree of leverage. These organizations include The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), along with the Mekong–Ganga Cooperation (MGC). While all these institutions have some potential in dealing with functional issues, though, none give the high level
of hosting profile accorded China in terms of interregional forums such as APEC, the AIIB, or the BRI.

Brazil’s institutional range shares some of India’s characteristics. Akin to India, Brazil is a member of an array of the traditional formal institutions, the UN specialized agencies, the IMF, the BIS, the IBRD, and the WTO, as well as the G20. Again, like India, it is full member of the G77 although only an observer of NAM. And Brazil is a foundational member of Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), a Commonwealth equivalent. Although not a member of the Asian Development Bank, Brazil belongs to the African Development Bank, and the Caribbean Development Bank. Even with this sort of participation though, Brazil has a much smaller profile in inter-regional organizations. Brazil’s participation in the G4 opens up the asymmetrical divergence with China, given the latter country’s privileged P5 UNSC membership. Furthermore, belonging to a faded IBSA is no compensation for being excluded from more prominent interregional organizations whether the established APEC, or the newer AIIB or BRI. The only other straddling organization Brazil belongs to is the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean Summit (EU-LAC).

Moving beyond global protection to an assessment of the regional footprint, the comparisons with India continue. Brazil has far more leadership capacity in the regional organizations it belongs to than does India. This is especially true in the case of Brazil’s role in Mercosur and up to recently USASUR, on top of its membership in the older Pan-American organization the Organization of American States (OAS) and the newer forum, CELAC. On the negative side, the stalling of these organizations has pointed to the limitations of Brazil’s position. Rather than having a vibrant base of regional organizations to build on, Brazil suffers from the decline—and in the case of UNASUR, the collapse—of this type of architecture.

An attempt to ascertain a more structured list is possible, via the the CIA World Fact Book for example (CIA 2016), but this runs up against a moving target. By 2017 figures, China is calculated to be a member of 41 international organizations (and another 9 as an observer or dialog partner), as compared to 39 for India (with another 5 as an observer or dialogue partner), and 38 for Brazil (with another 3 as an observer or dialogue partner). However, the World Fact Book website does not include China’s membership in the EBRD which only happened in 2016 and it also did not include all three countries’ membership in the AIIB and NDB so “datedness” is inevitable.

With these gaps in mind, a better evaluation of the global footprint in comparative perspective can be gauged utilizing a list of diplomatic postings (Lowy 2017; Elcano Royal Institute 2018). Not only is measurement of this type possible, but the evidence is compelling in the sense that the calculations fit with the impressionistic literature about hierarchical rankings. Meshing with the pervasive image of it becoming a global power, China stands out as having the biggest global reach among the core BRICS/MIKTA countries. For sure, China’s standing in respect to this condition of globality is more equivalent to the traditional great powers than rising powers. Within 2017, 268 diplomatic missions, using data from the Lowy Institute’s Diplomacy Index, China’s level of diplomatic representation is just behind the USA (273), but ahead of France (266), the Russian Federation (242), and the UK (225).
Just as striking as China’s condition of globality is the ambition of the other core BRICS states in building this type of global footprint. As with the case of China, therefore, there is a connection between this type of diplomatic range and impressionistic images of global ranking in the country-specific literature. While lagging behind China, both Brazil and India demonstrate a great deal of weight with regard to this type of representational profile. While not in the same league of the incumbent powers, Brazil and India have separated themselves from most of the rest. Brazil had in 2017, 221 diplomatic missions, and India 181, roughly approximate to the other members of the G4 UNSC aspirant group, with Japan at 229 missions, and Germany 224.

Yet, if the rankings among the core BRICS meet expectations from the country-specific and impressionistic literature, there are nuances in the MIKTA cluster that merit close examination as well. In overall terms, the pattern of separation between the core BRICS and MIKTA countries are consistent with the subjective image of globality. Korea (172) and Mexico (156) are below the BRICS as could be predicted in a more generalized assessment of the global hierarchy, although the gap between them and India is not all that great. As with the globalization index figures, Indonesia is the evident “under performer” with only 133. Indonesia, in fact, lies at the bottom of the BRICS/MIKTA countries.

Still, it is the superior performance of Turkey in terms of the condition of globality that stands out. Turkey has 229 diplomatic missions, ahead of both Brazil and India and the rest of the core MIKTA countries. One possible explanation is that Turkey, given its historical imperial/Ottoman background, places the same heavy onus on representational status as the P5 UNSC countries (Parlar Dal 2016). This explanation is reinforced by the fact that (as below) the profile of Turkey’s diplomatic missions is at odds with its economic/trade profile, thus accentuating the impression that Turkey’s condition of globality is more political/symbolic in nature than economic/instrumental.

The other possible explanation goes back to Turkey’s institutional range. Unlike India and Brazil, Turkey has played down its global aspirations as a UNSC candidate, preferring to concentrate on the need for democratic reform within the UN. Yet, as noted, Turkey does have a different sort of global reach, with some long-standing degree of concentration on older Western-European based organizations notably the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe, the Organization for Cooperation and Security (OSCE), and NATO. Some of this performance in the number of missions in geographic terms is reinforced in turn by the large Turkish diaspora in Western Europe. This focus is in conformity with Turkey’s large number of consulates. Although Turkey has 229 diplomatic missions, it has only, 102 embassies (Figueroa and Schiavon 2014; Gomez Bruera 2015). This number is well below all the other BRICS members, including South Africa. Rather Turkey has focused on consular functions. In fact, Turkey has 3 diplomatic missions in Austria, 3 in Belgium, 7 in France, 14 in Germany, 5 in Greece, and 4 in the Netherlands, highlighting the importance to Turkey of these consular functions.

Other institutional connections reinforce a “straddling” profile within interregional organizations. One is Turkey’s membership in its extended neighborhood, reflected in its membership in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
Business Council (BSEC), but also encompassing the Mediterranean, Central Asia, and across Africa. Another is Turkey’s membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), with a membership concentrated in North Africa, the Middle East, and Central and South East Asia.

In teasing out the figures of Turkey’s diplomatic missions, it is this complex mix of connections that appears to be salient. Turkey has just over 40 missions in Africa, including 2 in Somalia. In Central Asia Turkey has a wide number of missions, including 3 in Kazakhstan, 3 in Azerbaijan, and 2 in Afghanistan. Turkey also has a wide number of missions in core Middle East/majority Islamic countries including 2 in Saudi Arabia, 4 in Iran, 4 in Iraq, 2 in Syria, and 2 in the UAE.

Turkey projects, then, a hybrid status, with some features of a high-level global reach, but also with a heavy albeit varied regional focus. This status is even more accentuated still when Turkey’s profile is contrasted with the other core MIKTA countries. Korea’s diplomatic profile is far more concentrated. Korea has for instance, 13 missions in the USA, a focus clearly related to economic stratégic instrumentality. In terms of the number of out of region diplomatic representation, it is significant that Korea has 27 missions in Africa, extensive, but not as many as Turkey. By way of contrast, Korea has a much greater concentration in Asia than Turkey, with over 45, 10 of which are in China and 10 in Japan.

The type of concentrated focus exhibited by Korea is shared by Indonesia and Mexico. Indonesia does have 6 missions in the USA but by far the heaviest concentration is in its own Asian region with 32, and another 9 in Oceania. The main similarity with Korea comes out with another large cluster of 22 missions in the Middle East/Islamic countries. This concentration is even more accentuated in the case of Mexico. Although Mexico’s missions do cover Europe, Asia and the Middle East in respectable numbers, there is a big difference in Africa where Mexico only has 9 missions. By way of comparison, Mexico has a heavy focus in its extended Americas region (35) outside of the USA. However, it is the magnified focus on the USA that is the main feature of Mexican diplomatic representation. There are 51 missions in the USA. With such a heavy concentration on consular activities in the USA, the overall number of Mexican embassies is strikingly small. In the entire cluster of BRICS/MIKTA countries, Mexico ranks at the bottom even below Indonesia with only 74 embassies (Figueroa and Schiavon 2014; Gomez Bruera 2015).

Through the lens of diplomatic reach, the gap between the core BRICS and MIKTA countries meets general expectations. The only exception is Turkey that engages on the global stage above the image of just a regional country. This outlier position goes “hand in hand” with a wider institutional reach. In contrast to Korea, Indonesia, and Mexico, Turkey has a far greater range than its MIKTA counterparts in terms of its institutional membership.

**Measuring the Second Dimension of Globality: Trade Profile**

Evaluation on the basis of a combination of qualitative and quantitative measures with regard to institutional/diplomatic range is amplified through an examination of the material footprint, most notably on the trade profile of these countries. With 2015 data from the World Bank (World Bank 2015),
China’s condition of globality once more is at the highest rank. China’s extensive global footprint in trade differentiates it from the other countries being examined here. Using figures combining trade in goods and services, China’s trade adds up to an impressive $US 4718.9 billion or 42.65 percent of GDP. In terms of regional distribution to East Asia and the Pacific, China’s “home” market accounts for 39.90 percent of its exports. Still, consistent with its institutional/diplomatic profile there is a good spread between trade with other regions, with 19.20 of China’s exports going to Europe and Central America, and 19.31 percent going to North America.

India’s material projection in terms of trade profile is rather less impressive in contrast to China. India’s overall export trade lags behind China’s with just $US824.04 billion, although with the approximate equivalence of 42.08 percent in terms of GDP. What is even more noticeable is that India does not have a fallback neighborhood profile. India is far less focused in its regional market, with only 6.53 percent directed at South Asia. Nevertheless, there is some correspondence to China’s condition of globality: 22.77 percent of India’s exports go to East Asia and the Pacific; 20.02 percent goes to Europe and Central Asia; and 16.04 percent goes to North America.

Brazil’s export trade profile is both lower than the other core BRIC states with $US467.06 billion in total trade, and in GDP terms with 25.90 percent. Brazil taps into its neighborhood market in a far more robust fashion than India with 20.19 percent of exports going to Latin America and the Caribbean. In other ways the figures are equivalent to China at least in percentage figures, with 29.77 percent of Brazil’s going to East Asia and the Pacific and 21.52 percent going to Europe and Central Asia, and 13.91 percent going to North America.

What stands out most from this data is that all of the core BRICS can be deemed to have some, albeit limited, globality in terms of their export trade profile. Although East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, and North America stand out, all of the regions are covered to some extent. Brazil has a good export profile in the Middle East and North Africa, with 7.29 percent. India sends 7.84 percent of its trade to sub-Saharan Africa. And China does roughly the same with 6.16 percent of its trade going to sub-Saharan Africa.

It is on the material footprint, far more than the institutional/diplomatic reach, that the structural difference between the core BRICS and MIKTA states really stand out. Although Korea has made giant strides in trade, the divergence between the global reach of the core BRICS and its own more restricted profile is evident. Although the export figures are comparatively high, with $US624.63 billion and 45.33 percent of GDP, it is the regional focus that is most relevant. East Asia and Oceania takes 54.8 percent of Korean trade, with only 12.57 percent going to Europe and Central Asia, and 14.57 percent going to North America. Indonesia falls into a similar pattern, albeit with a smaller export trade profile: $US198.27 billion and 23 percent of GDP. As with Korea, over half of Indonesian exports, 56.66 percent, go to East Asia and Oceania. The main difference is that the rest of Indonesia’s trade is spread out not only with Europe and Central Asia, 11.43 percent, and North America, 9.84 percent but South Asia 9.19 percent. Mexico exaggerates this trend further with an export profile of $US403.49 billion and 35.28 percent of GDP. Although the export figures are not too far from Brazil’s, it is the concentration on the neighborhood market that is the
defining component for Mexico trade with North America taking a dramatic 84.01 percent. Little space is left for Europe and Central Asia, 5.41 percent or even Latin America and the Caribbean, 5.85 percent.

As in the case of globality with respect to institutions/diplomatic reach, it is Turkey that serves as a partial outlier. Although its material profile is less impressive than the core BRICS, its distribution is closer to those states. In actual figures Turkey’s trade profile is similar to Indonesia’s: $US190.70 billion and 26.57 percent of GDP. But Turkey’s footprint is wider. Two key regions, Europe and Central Asia, clustered together amount to a formidable 57.81 percent but although further back, the Middle East and North America are important as well, 25.80 percent. As with the institutions/diplomatic category, there is no sense of an over reliance of one region.

Measuring the Final Dimension of Globality: Trajectory of Official Development Assistance

Beyond institutional/diplomatic reach and trade profile the next best indicator of globality remains official development assistance, or ODA. Although the data is far from perfect, the figures do provide a gauge of the international/regional dimension of the core BRICS/MIKTA countries. As on the other two sets of data, it is China’s massive global footprint that is striking. Starting in 2000, China has made huge strides in building South–South cooperation. As evidenced by a 2011 White Paper, the focus of this approach is on grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans. For example, by the end of 2009, China had provided concessional loans to 76 foreign countries, mostly to support infrastructure development in the energy and resources sectors.

Unlike some other BRICS or MIKTA countries, China has traditionally played down trilateral cooperation, preferring to direct its activities with the host country and not other donors. The scale of this strategy is unmatched. In one significant calculation, researchers at AidData at the College of William and Mary estimates via their “Chinese Global Official Finance” dataset that there are over 4,000 Chinese-financed projects in 138 countries (Dreher et al. 2017). Moreover, the distribution of China’s activities are scattered on an impressive scale through East Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the Caribbean.

Whatever the method, though, these figures once more pushed China well ahead of the other core BRICS/MIKTA states when determining globality. Whereas according to the OECD figures China’s total ODA was $US3.1 billion in 2015 (OECD 2018), India’s lagged severely behind with a figure of $US1.4 billion in 2014 and $US1.8 billion in 2015. That being said, India’s official development assistance spending has risen considerably in recent years.

In drilling down on the Indian data, two features are noticeable. The first is how quickly India has moved from being a recipient of ODA to being an ODA donor. And the second noticeable feature is how Indian ODA remains concentrated in India’s own region. While Africa as a continent received $US56 million in 2014–15, it is the focus on South Asia that is the most conspicuous characteristic with eight key countries receiving high levels of ODA. In addition to Bhutan and Afghanistan, which are at the top, India’s other close neighbors in South Asia: Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, and the
Maldives (leaving out Pakistan) are dominant recipients of Indian foreign aid as well (Cooper and Farooq 2015).

Brazil’s expenditure on development cooperation is also extensive, if far lower than China and India. On the basis of OECD figures, Brazil provided $US397 million on development cooperation in 2013 (OECD 2018). As with China and India, the definition of development cooperation is diffuse and contested, as Brazil allocated $US126 million for technical cooperation (TC), $US139 million for scholarships, and $USD79 million for humanitarian relief. The technical assistance budget rose from $US11 million in 2005 to $US49 million in 2009, so doubling the total share of the development cooperation budget from 7.2 percent to 13.5 percent.

In terms of distribution, the main focus has been the combination of Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2010, Africa was the top recipient with 57 percent ($US22 million) of attention from the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC—Agência Brasileira de Cooperação), project expenditures. Although a good deal of this focus was on Portuguese-speaking countries (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé, and Príncipe), Brazil has expanded its reach to a number of other countries including Benin, Tanzania, and Kenya. Its own neighborhood in turn received 37 percent ($US14.4 million) of ABC project expenditures in 2010, with 30 countries in Latin America receiving aid programming and technical cooperation extending mainly to Jamaica, Guyana, Suriname, and Haiti in the Caribbean. Of these, Haiti is particularly significant given Brazil’s high-profile leadership of the UN peacekeeping mission (Semrau and Thiele 2017).

Turning to the trajectory of the core MIKTA states, it is as much as the distinctions between individual countries in that cluster as between the BRICS and MIKTA more generally that stand out. With spending of $US2.0 billion in 2016, Korea is a high-level donor country, with a wide scope of development assistance. Still in keeping with the other findings on institutional/diplomatic and material/trade profiles, Korea’s bilateral assistance has an explicit concentration in the Asia region. Funding to this region encompassed 51 percent of bilateral ODA between 2013 and 2015. The largest recipient during this time was Vietnam, which received around 15 percent of bilateral ODA, predominantly as loans.

This is not to suggest that Korea is totally locked into its immediate neighborhood. It has 24 priority countries for ODA, but 11 of these are in the Asia-Pacific region, 7 in sub-Saharan Africa, 4 in Latin America and 2 in Central Asia. The focus on Asia was reaffirmed by the 2017 International Cooperation Action Plan which allocates 57 percent of bilateral ODA to the Asia-Pacific region, 25 percent to sub-Saharan Africa and 11 percent to the Middle East/Central Asia (Donor Tracker 2018).

While among the BRICS/MIKTA states it uniquely remains a recipient country, Indonesia has signaled a ramping up of its development cooperation strategy. In 2018, Foreign Minister Retno LP Marsudi, announced that a new agency—to be called Indonesia Aid, would coordinate with all existing technical cooperation programs already in place for developing countries. On a quantitative level, however, Indonesia still lags behind. By OECD estimates, Indonesia has allocated around US$56 million of foreign assistance in 2014 (Jarkata Post 2018; Asia Foundation 2014). As it stands, Indonesia cooperates bilaterally with around 40 partner countries, most of them in Asia, in a variety of sectors.
Mexico is even more trapped in terms of its profile, with a concentrated focus on its own region. Mexico’s international development cooperation reached $US288 million in 2014, down from $US396 million in 2013 (OECD 2018). Mexico’s priority partner countries are those in Latin America and the Caribbean, with a special concentration on Central America. The main vehicle for regional cooperation is the Mesoamerican Integration and Development Project that covers initiatives in public health, environmental sustainability, risk management, food security, trade facilitation, transport, energy, and telecommunications. With this experience in Mesoamerica behind it, Mexico has also taken other regional initiatives in the Caribbean and the Northern Triangle. Mexico also financed infrastructure development in the region through the “Yucatán Fund” (OECD 2018).

As in other sets of data, Turkey again comes to the fore as an outlier on ODA provision. Yet as with the MIKTA countries the limitations are obvious. With respect to profile it stands above the rest of the BRICS and MIKTA states besides China, in that by OECD estimates Turkey’s net 2015 ODA amounted to $US3.9 billion. Between 2011 and 2012, the increase in Turkey’s ODA was due to circumstances related to its response to the refugee crisis in its neighboring country, Syria. The share of Turkey’s total ODA allocated to Syria increased to 70 percent in 2015, compared to 65 percent in 2014 and 52 percent in 2013 (Piccio 2017; OECD 2018). Such a burden puts pressure on the traditional balanced approach that Turkey aimed for, in earlier periods demonstrating that while the Middle East was important for Turkish ODA this region was below the Caucasus and Central Asia and the Balkans and East Europe.

**Conclusion**

This article demonstrates the value of moving beyond impressionistic images of hierarchical positioning. This standard approach, with a bias toward a binary distinction between a top tier of rising states and a secondary tier trapped into their own regions is inadequate.

Employing globality with a focus on “the empowerment of self-aware social actors” (Robertson 1992, 132), via the more objective metrics of institutional/diplomatic range; trade profile; and the trajectory of official development assistance among the collective of “rising” states, provides a much better examination of the global reach of rising powers. It enables us to distinguish those that are achieving a global reach and those that remain largely restricted to their region. The data show the BRICS members have the highest level of global projection, with the MIKTA countries lagging behind. In specific country terms, China is at the top of the rankings with respect to globality. China is not held back regionally; instead, China has developed a global footprint. Indeed, the major takeaway is how far ahead of the other BRICS/MIKTA states China is measured by globality. On all the metrics in this study, China’s footprint is consistent with the image of an ambitious and multidimensional global China.

India and Brazil, by way of comparison, fall into the category of states with some elements of globality, but with projections that fall short of China’s global reach. The strongest globality measure for these two countries is in their level of diplomatic representation through missions around the world. In other ways, though, the profiles of India and Brazil are less impressive. Neither has the full institutional range that might be anticipated
from a top tier global state. Furthermore, this gap is not only due to the absence of P5 UNSC status. It is also reflected in the bias toward regional or sub-regional organizations as opposed to interregional forums.

The deficiencies in globality are amplified in turn by the gaps in India’s and Brazil’s profile in trade and ODA targeting. The projection of both of these counties tilt toward the regional far more than China. India and Brazil are bigger global players than Korea, Indonesia and Mexico, but fall short of China’s global projection.

The MIKTA countries, for their part, fit the model of more limited globality. Korea is China in reverse. While Korea has some considerable elements of a strong global footprint, with a high diplomatic range, an impressive trade profile, and high levels of ODA trajectory, the limitations in terms of Korea’s globality is evident as well. Korea is thin with regard to global or interregional institutional membership, and both its trade and ODA figures lean toward a regional projection.

Indonesia and Mexico reinforce the conclusion that the profile of the MIKTA states remain regional and not global. In all the different measurements, the overwhelming image is of countries entrapped in their neighborhoods, by a combination of choice and the imposition of structural barriers. Although there has been a narrative in the past that Indonesia and Mexico could enhance their global profiles, on the basis of this data this prediction is unrealistic. Both countries might be big market countries with impressive demographics, but they do not fit the image of top-tier rising states.

The exception to the rule is Turkey. If not a candidate for UNSC permanent membership, nor a state with a trade profile matching either Korea nor Mexico, never mind the core BRICS countries, Turkey’s global reach is highly significant nevertheless. In terms of the number of missions it possesses around the world, Turkey projects above where it might be expected to be. And the same is true in terms of its ODA profile, where it is a top tier country.

As assumed by the impressionistic oriented literature, Korea, Mexico, and Indonesia are in different ways hemmed in from a regional perspective. As with India and Brazil, joining the G20 has been important as a signifier that they can play bigger on the global stage. However, their profiles indicate in some cases a lack of ambition and in other cases deficiencies in structural capacity. Only Turkey constitutes an outlier to this general profile: a contour that has encouraged sustained speculation that Turkey might join the summit process (Bacik 2013).

If the value of examining the concept of globality by objective data reinforces subjective appraisals, these metrics also confirm both the collective and individual differences between BRICS and MIKTA countries in terms of hierarchy and global projection. The globality examination is salient also in explaining why these different groupings have such different trajectories with respect to the practice of global summity. With much higher levels of globality than the MIKTA members, the expression of national ambition not only in terms of G20 participation but in terms of the evolution of a parallel forum of their own has a formidable animating logic for the BRICS. Even with all their differences in capabilities and role assessment, motivations in terms of the rewards from status enhancement outweigh the risk of advancing collective activity and tie them together. With globality emphasizing agency by self-aware actors, the BRICS share a comfort level with both diverse and heightened forms of institutionalized global projection. In contradistinction, the context of being regionally entrapped and less capable of global projection, limits
the repertoire of summitry. While the MIKTA countries have embraced the hub forum of global economic governance, their commitment to parallel activities in the form of a leader-driven process have been far more constrained. While the rewards of belonging to the G20 have been abundantly acknowledged, most notably through the MIKTA countries, with the exception of Indonesia, taking on the hosting function, the risks of operating together in an elevated summit of their own have dominated, limiting the institutionalized expression of a shared operational ambition.

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Works Cited


